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Introduction 
All elections are unique, but the Australian federal election of 2010 was unusual for 
many reasons. It came in the wake of the unprecedented ousting of the Prime Minister 
who had led the Australian Labor Party to a landslide victory, after eleven years in 
opposition, at the previous election in 2007. In a move that to many would have been 
unthinkable, Kevin Rudd’s increasing unpopularity within his own parliamentary 
party finally took its toll and in late June he was replaced by his deputy, Julia Gillard. 
Thus the second unusual feature of the election was that it was contested by 
Australia’s first female prime minister. The third unusual feature was that the election 
almost saw a first-term government, with a comfortable majority, defeated. Instead it 
resulted in a hung parliament, for the first time since 1940, and Labor scraped back 
into power as a minority government, supported by three independents and the first 
member of the Australian Greens ever to be elected to the House of Representatives. 
The Coalition Liberal and National opposition parties themselves had a leader of only 
eight months standing, Tony Abbott, whose ascension to the position had surprised 
more than a few. This was the context for an investigation of voting behaviour in the 
2010 election. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on the 2010 Australian Election Study 
(AES), conducted by Ian McAllister, Clive Bean, Rachel Gibson and Juliet Pietsch 
immediately following the federal election in August (McAllister et al. 2011). The 
data come from a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-
completion questionnaire mailed to respondents just after the federal election. The 
survey was based on a systematic random sample of enrolled voters throughout 
Australia, stratified by state, drawn by the Australian Electoral Commission. After the 
initial mailing, the response rate was boosted by several follow-ups to non-
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respondents. The final response rate was 42 per cent. The data were weighted to 
reflect population parameters for gender, age, state and vote, giving a final sample 
size of 2061.  
 
Campaign orientations 
The election was held less than two months after the replacement of Rudd by Gillard, 
with that event still clearly on people’s minds. Nonetheless, public attention to the 
campaign was no greater than in the last election in 2007 and less in some respects, 
although it was greater for the most part than at the elections of 2001 and 2004 (Table 
1). Fewer voters than in 2007 took a general interest in the election campaign (34per 
cent compared to 40 per cent in 2007) or cared which party won (68 per cent 
compared to 76 per cent). Levels of attention to the campaign through the media, on 
the other hand, were almost identical to 2007, with 62 per cent, 77 per cent and 48 per 
cent saying they paid a good deal or some attention to the campaign in newspapers, 
television and radio respectively in 2010. Attention to the campaign via the internet, 
however, almost doubled, with 29 per cent of the AES sample saying they paid 
attention to the campaign on the internet in 2010, compared to 16 per cent three years 
earlier.  
Another question asking respondents whether they used the internet to get 
news or information about the election showed a similar increase, the proportion 
rising from 20 per cent in 2007 to 36 per cent in 2010. The 2010 percentage is four 
times what it was back in 2001 and it would be surprising if we were not seeing such 
strong growth in the use of the internet for political purposes. Table 1 also shows that 
some 47 per cent said they watched the televised leaders’ debate, held early in the 
campaign, almost identical to 2007. Nearly four in ten (37 per cent) judged Gillard to 
 4
have won the debate over Tony Abbott, with only 22 per cent awarding the contest to 
the Leader of the Opposition. 
Table 1 here 
For some time there has been evidence that the numbers of voters leaving their 
final voting decision until into the election campaign is increasing in various 
democracies (McAllister 2002). In Australia, however, this trend, which developed 
pace in the 1990s (Bean and McAllister 2000), reversed in the early part of this 
century to the point where in 2007 it was back to the low levels of the 1980s (Bean 
and McAllister 2009). But the uncertain context of the 2010 election sent the 
proportion of late-deciding voters back up to near the levels of the late 1990s, with 47 
per cent saying they definitely decided how they would vote during the election 
campaign (Table 2). At the same time, 29 per cent said they seriously thought of 
giving their first preference vote in the House of Representatives to a different party 
from the one for which they eventually voted.  
Table 2 here 
 Party identification, which declined somewhat in the late 1990s (Bean and 
McAllister 2000, 183), has been very steady since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. A little under 80 per cent of the electorate now identifies with one of the 
major parties (78 per cent in 2010) and about one in six or seven claims not to be a 
party identifier at all (14 per cent in 2010). Given the volatile nature of the 2010 
election, as reflected in the success of independent candidates and minor parties and 
in the suboptimal outcome for the two major parties, it is perhaps a little surprising 
that party identification did not slip further in 2010.  In continuing to exhibit relatively 
high levels of party identification, even in such circumstances, Australia stands apart 
from many other countries, where party loyalties have been in decline over the last 
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few decades (White and Davies 1998; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Webb, Farrell 
and Holliday 2003). On the other hand, the proportion of very strong identifiers has 
settled back to where it had been (19 per cent) after an increase in 2007 that now 
appears to have been an aberration rather than the beginning of a trend. 
 
Socio-demographics and the vote 
While relationships between social structure and voting are now consistently weaker 
than they used to be (McAllister 2011), the extent to which demographics and social 
location align with support for different political parties nevertheless continues to 
warrant attention. With the first female prime minister contesting an Australian 
national election, gender is a variable of particular interest.  The traditional 
association between gender and party, in which women voted more conservatively 
than men, has not been in evidence in Australia for some time (Bean and McAllister 
2009). The evidence for 2010 suggests that having a woman leading the government 
may make a difference to how women vote, with 8 per cent more women giving their 
first preference vote in the House of Representatives to the Labor Party than men and 
9 per cent more men voting Liberal-National than women (Table 3). This, of course, 
represents a reversal of the traditional gender gap. 
Table 3 here 
 Reminiscent of the 2004 election, Labor fared badly with both young and old 
voters in 2010, despite the fact that the more usual pattern is for Labor to show a 
significant degree of appeal to younger voters (Bean 2007). The Greens, who usually 
attract good support from the young, appear to have been the main beneficiary again 
on this occasion, while the advantage enjoyed by the Coalition among voters 65 and 
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over has grown quite large, with the Greens as well as Labor faring particularly 
poorly among this cohort.  
The traditional urban-rural divide remains clearly in evidence in 2010, with 
the Coalition favoured in rural areas. With respect to religion, Protestant 
denominations preferred the Coalition, as usual, and those with no religion preferred 
Labor or the Greens. However, Catholics, although more favourable to Labor than 
Protestants, were more inclined to opt for the Coalition than Labor, a situation which 
though unusual in Australian electoral history, has occurred before, in the elections of 
1996 and 2004 (Bean 2000; Bean and McAllister 2005). For the other dimension of 
religion, church attendance, as we have come to expect frequent attenders favoured 
the Coalition and non-attenders Labor (and the Greens), but in between the patterns 
lacked consistency. 
Table 4 turns the focus to socio-economic status variables. In terms of 
education, the Coalition appears to have done best among electors who have some 
post-school education but not at the university level, while the Greens did particularly 
well among the university qualified (with 20 per cent of such voters giving the Greens 
their first preference). In attracting the votes of the university educated in such large 
numbers, the Greens completely eliminated the advantage Labor has had over the 
Coalition among this group in recent elections (Bean and McAllister 2009).  
Table 4 here 
Table 4 also shows that the tendency in recent elections for the strength of 
occupational voting to be variable (Bean and McAllister 2009; McAllister 2011) 
continued in 2010. Once the rock of Australian electoral choice, class voting (as 
measured by the difference between the non-manual vote for Labor and the manual 
vote for Labor) has dipped below 10 per cent at some recent elections, but has reached 
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as high as (a still modest) 17 per cent at others (Bean and McAllister 2009). In 2007 it 
was 15 per cent. In 2010, class voting was down again, at 9 per cent, continuing the 
trend for it to be up at one election and down at the next.  
The last two sections of Table 4 show that employment sector and trade union 
membership continue to shape the vote. For instance, 48 per cent of government 
employees reported voting Labor, compared with 27 per cent of the self-employed, 
while 53 per cent of union members voted Labor compared with 36 per cent of voters 
who were not members of a trade union.  
 
Leader evaluations 
Party leader evaluations play a consistently significant role in Australian elections, 
although despite some speculation to the contrary there is little indication that their 
impact is on the rise (Senior and van Onselen 2008). The impact of leadership varies 
in different circumstances. In 2010, the presence of a female prime minister, as well 
as the fact that both major party leaders were relatively new in the role, generated 
additional attention for the leadership factor. Compared to past elections, no leader 
rated highly in 2010. Table 5 has the relevant data. Gillard herself received a mean 
rating of 4.9 (on a scale where zero represents a strong dislike, 5 represents a neutral 
position and 10 represents a strong liking for the leader). While not a strong rating, it 
was considerably higher than that for Abbott, whose mean score was only 4.3. 
Ironically, but probably of no surprise to many, the politician with the highest rating 
was deposed leader Rudd, who slightly outdid his successor by recording a mean 
rating of 5.0. A question in the AES, specifically included to gauge voter reactions to 
the overthrow of Rudd, found that virtually three-quarters of the electorate (74 per 
cent) disapproved of the way the leadership change was handled by the Labor Party. 
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Table 5 here 
The Labor and Liberal parties as such were more popular with the public than 
the party leaders, both recording mean ratings of 5.1. The leaders of the smaller 
parties – Warren Truss of the Nationals and Bob Brown of the Greens – were also 
marginally less popular than the parties they led.  
 The data in Table 6 also show that gender again played a role in leadership 
evaluations (see also Denemark, Ward and Bean 2011). Women rated Gillard 
considerably higher and Abbott somewhat lower than men. Viewing the same 
information from a different perspective, we see that men rated Gillard and Abbott 
equally (both at 4.5), while there was a very large difference among women in favour 
of Gillard, who received a mean rating of 5.3 among women compared to Abbott’s 
4.0. Two other patterns stand out in Table 6. Abbott was the only politician of the six 
included in the survey who was rated more favourably by men than by women. As 
well as Gillard, Truss, Brown, Wayne Swan and Rudd all had higher scores among 
women than among men. As a result, at least in the election of 2010, women voters 
emerge as having a considerably more positive view of politicians overall than men. 
The mean rating of the six leaders by women was 4.6. The mean rating by men was 
4.3. And the final point of interest in Table 6 is that Rudd was almost as popular 
among women as Gillard. 
Table 6 here 
Gillard’s advantage over Abbott remained when individual leadership qualities 
were examined. Respondents were asked how well a list of leadership qualities 
described each of the two major party leaders. Gillard outscored Abbott on all nine 
items. Gillard’s best quality was deemed to be her intelligence (87 per cent of AES 
respondents judging this quality to describe her extremely or quite well), followed by 
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her being seen to be knowledgeable. She also was rated highly for being competent 
and sensible, while at the other end of the scale she was not seen as being trustworthy 
or inspiring. Interestingly, Abbott’s image largely shadowed Gillard’s, at both ends of 
the scale, but always with lower proportions of voters rating him well on the 
particular trait and in some cases much lower. The only instances in which the 
difference between Abbott and Gillard was minimal occurred with respect to traits on 
which both were judged poorly – trustworthiness, honesty and, to a lesser extent, 
strength of leadership. 
Table 7 here 
 
Issues 
The policy issues debated in election campaigns involve a mix of the perennial and 
the topical. Recent research on Australian elections has pointed to the importance of 
issues for voting choice and election outcomes (Goot and Watson 2007) in contrast to 
the conventional wisdom that election campaigns and therefore election issues make 
very little difference (see, for example, Aitkin 1982). The 2010 AES asked 
respondents to rate twelve issues in terms of their importance (Table 8). Health is 
always on the agenda in modern elections. But irrespective of how prominent it is in 
the parties’ campaigns, the issue of health and Medicare is invariably the issue of 
most concern to voters. And so it was yet again in 2010, with 73 per cent of voters 
saying the issue was extremely important, clearly ahead of any other issue. Next came 
management of the economy (70 per cent rated it extremely important) and then 
education (with 61 per cent seeing it as extremely important).  
Table 8 here 
 10
 No other issue had as many as 50 per cent calling it extremely important. In 
fact the drop off to the next issue was huge – nearly 20 per cent. Interest rates (43 per 
cent), the environment (41 per cent), taxation and unemployment (both 40 per cent) 
were next, but a very long way behind. Two topical issues in the campaign, the 
mining resources tax and population policy rated only 30 per cent and 32 per cent 
respectively. Likewise, global warming was seen as extremely important by only 30 
per cent of the sample and industrial relations rated least important of all with 28 per 
cent.  
Of the three top issues, the far right hand column of Table 8 shows that Labor 
had an advantage on health and education, in that voters reported that Labor’s policies 
on these issues came closer than the Coalition’s policies to their own views, while the 
Coalition had an advantage on management of the economy. Labor’s advantage on 
education in particular was quite large, with 17 per cent more voters saying the Labor 
Party was closer to them on this issue than the Coalition. 
The middle columns of Table 8 demonstrate that the concerns of Labor voters 
largely mirrored those of the electorate as a whole. Labor voters showed particular 
concern about health and education. The concerns of Liberal-National voters 
represented greater extremes, with 80 per cent citing management of the economy as 
extremely important, on the one hand, and only 16 per cent showing such concern 
about global warming, on the other. Coalition voters also displayed a relative lack of 
concern about the environment in general and considerably more concern than Labor 
voters about the resources tax. As would be expected, the environment was the 
greatest concern for Green voters, albeit closely followed by health and with 
education also not far behind. Green voters showed a comparative lack of concern 
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about management of the economy, but were much more concerned than others about 
global warming.  
 
Explaining the vote 
But how much if at all did these issues and other factors matter for the decisions by 
individual voters to give their first preference votes to one party other another? To 
round out the analysis we look collectively at the key variables we have been 
considering above to estimate their independent impact on the vote in the 2010 
election. This is achieved through the application of multivariate analysis which 
estimates the net effect of each factor on the vote while controlling for all the others. 
The analysis includes each of the socio-demographic variables examined earlier in the 
chapter, the party leader ratings and the campaign issues, plus party identification. For 
ease of presentation, only the variables whose effects are statistically significant are 
shown in Table 9. Methodological details are provided in the appendix. 
Table 9 here 
  Table 9 shows that four socio-demographic variables – gender, education, 
religious denomination and region of residence – had statistically significant effects 
on the vote in 2010, albeit of very modest size. With all other factors in the model 
taken into account, males, the university educated, Catholics and rural residents all 
showed a greater inclination to vote Liberal-National rather than Labor compared to 
females, those without a university degree, Protestants (the reference category for 
religious denomination in the multivariate analysis) and urban residents. For gender 
and religion these results represent the reverse of the traditional associations between 
these variables and the vote (McAllister 2011) and in the latter case it means that 
Labor can no longer claim to always be the party that attracts the Catholic vote.  
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It remains important to emphasise, however, the small size of all of these 
social-structural effects, particularly in contrast to party identification which as usual 
had far and away the largest effect. The unstandardised regression coefficient shows 
that Liberal-National identifiers were 55 per cent more likely to vote for the Coalition 
parties than Labor identifiers after all the other variables were taken into account. 
 Though small by comparison, leadership too, had a significant impact on 
voting behaviour in 2010 and larger than at some recent elections (Senior and van 
Onselen 2008; Bean and McAllister 2009). Voters who strongly liked Gillard were 24 
per cent more likely to vote Labor rather than Liberal-National compared to voters 
who strongly disliked her (the negative sign in front of the coefficient in Table 9 
simply indicates that positive sentiment towards Gillard was associated with a 
preference for Labor). By the same token, voters who strongly liked Abbott were 15 
per cent more likely to vote Liberal-National than those who strongly disliked him. 
Interestingly, there was no effect for the man who had been prime minister until less 
than two months before the election, Rudd. 
Of the twelve issues included in the analysis, only two had statistically 
significant effects on the 2010 vote. Not surprisingly, given the focus on economic 
management during the global financial crisis over the two years leading up to the 
election, management of the economy was the strongest issue, with those who rated it 
as extremely important and were closer to the Coalition on the issue some 13 per cent 
more likely to vote Liberal-National rather than Labor compared to those who rated 
economic management as extremely important and were closer to Labor on the issue. 
Education, which has become more prominent as an issue over recent times (Bean and 
McAllister 2009; McAllister 2011), was the other significant issue, although its effect 
was more modest. Issues such as health and taxation, which have consistently affected 
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voting behaviour over the last two decades (Bean and McAllister 2009), did not reach 
statistical significance on this occasion. And no other issues featured, including the 
topical issues of population policy and taxing of the mining industry. 
But what did the influence of the two leaders and the two significant issues on 
individual voting choice mean for the outcome of the election? We can make such 
calculations by combining estimates of their effects on individual voting behaviour 
with the extent of bias inherent in each variable towards one major party or the other. 
The technicalities of the calculations are detailed in the appendix. We have already 
seen in the earlier parts of the chapter, for instance, that the Coalition had an 
advantage among the electorate on management of the economy, while Labor had an 
advantage on education and that Gillard was more popular (or, to be strictly correct, 
less unpopular) than Abbott. By combining the effect (the regression coefficient) and 
the bias towards Labor or the Coalition (derived from the mean of the variable) we are 
able to estimate the net impact of each variable on the balance of the party vote. These 
calculations show that, ironically, each of the party leaders conferred a benefit, not on 
their own party, but on the rival party. In Gillard’s case it was very small (around 0.2 
per cent), while for Abbott it was over 1 per cent, reflecting his substantially greater 
unpopularity. Combining the two, we arrive at a net leadership effect of 0.9 per cent 
in favour of the Labor Party.  
The two significant issues, on the other hand, virtually cancelled on another 
out. Management of the economy produced a net effect of 0.7 per cent to the 
Coalition, while education produced a net effect of 0.6 per cent to Labor, giving the 
barest advantage of 0.1 per cent to the Liberal-National parties for the two issues 
together. Subtracting this from the 0.9 per cent leadership effect, we get an overall 
effect for leaders and issues of 0.8 per cent in favour of Labor. While this advantage 
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might seem slim, its significance is seen when we consider that in the final vote count 
in the 2010 election the Labor Party edged out the Coalition by an extremely narrow 
margin of 50.1 per cent to 49.9 per cent in the two-party preferred vote. 
 Thus, in the end, amidst such a closely fought election, the leadership factor 
was crucial. Both major parties approached the election with leaders who were 
relatively inexperienced, untried and who lacked popularity within the electorate. But 
Abbott’s greater unpopularity meant that the toll was higher for the Coalition than for 
Labor. All other things being equal, the analysis in this chapter suggests that had the 
Coalition gone to the 2010 Australian federal election with a leader who was viewed 
more favourably across the electorate, the outcome probably would have been a 
narrow victory for the Liberals and Nationals.  
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Appendix 
The results shown in Table 9 are based on ordinary least squares multiple regression 
with pairwise deletion of missing data. The dependent variable, first preference vote 
for the House of Representatives in the 2010 federal election, is scored 0 for Labor, 
0.5 for minor parties and independent candidates and 1 for Liberal-National. 
Similarly, party identification is scored 0 for Labor, 0.5 for minor parties or no party 
identification and 1 for Liberal-National. Apart from age, scored in years, all other 
independent variables are either 0-1 dummy variables or scaled to run from a low 
score of 0 to a high score of 1.  
The issue variables are derived from a combination of the importance ratings 
and the party closer to the respondent, so that at one end of the scale those who rated 
the issue as extremely important and felt closer to the Labor Party on the issue are 
scored 0 and at the other end those who rated the issue as extremely important and felt 
closer to the coalition parties on the issue are scored 1.  
The calculations for the effects of the leaders on the balance of the party vote 
involves taking the difference between the neutral point of 0.5 on the 0-1 leadership 
rating scale and the mean score for each leader and multiplying that by the 
unstandardised regression coefficient for the leader. This is perhaps the best of several 
defensible ways of calculating leadership effects on the balance of the party vote 
(Senior and van Onselen 2008, 233-6). So for Gillard, the calculation was 0.49 – 0.5 = 
-0.01 x -0.24 = 0.2 per cent to the Coalition. For Abbott, the calculation was 0.43 – 
0.5 = -0.07 x 0.15 = 1.1 per cent to Labor. These two results are then added together 
to arrive at the net leadership impact on the vote of 0.9 per cent to Labor.  
Similarly, the calculation for the impact of each significant issue on the party 
balance involves subtracting the neutral point on the 0-1 scale of 0.5 from the mean of 
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each variable and multiplying that difference by the unstandardised regression 
coefficient for the variable. For education, the difference score was -0.08 (and the 
regression coefficient 0.08) and for management of the economy the difference was 
+0.05 (and the regression coefficient 0.13).  
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Table 1: Engagement with the election campaign 2001 – 2010 (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
 
2007 
 
2010 
 
Took ‘a good deal’ of interest in the 
election campaign overall 
 
Cared ‘a good deal’ which party won 
 
Paid ‘a good deal’ or ‘some’ attention to 
the campaign: 
- in newspapers 
- on television 
- on radio 
- on the internet 
 
Used the internet for election news or 
information 
 
Watched the televised leaders’ debate 
 
Thought Howard (2001 – 2007)/Gillard 
performed better in the debate 
 
 
 
31 
 
65 
 
 
 
53 
69 
43 
- 
 
 
  9 
 
40 
 
 
18 
 
 
30 
 
72 
 
 
 
57 
69 
44 
- 
 
 
12 
 
35 
 
 
25 
 
 
40 
 
76 
 
 
 
61 
77 
50 
16 
 
 
20 
 
46 
 
 
13 
 
 
34 
 
68 
 
 
 
62 
77 
48 
29 
 
 
36 
 
47 
 
 
37 
 
Sources: Australian Election Studies, 2001 (n=2010), 2004 (n=1769), 2007 (n=1873) 
and 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 2: Volatility, stability and partisanship 2001 – 2010 (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
 
2007 
 
2010 
 
Decided definitely how to vote during 
campaign period 
 
Seriously thought of giving first 
preference to another party in the House of 
Representatives during election campaign 
 
Always voted for same party 
 
Identifier with one of the major parties 
 
Not a party identifier 
 
Very strong party identifier 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
48 
 
77 
 
15 
 
19 
 
39 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
50 
 
77 
 
16 
 
21 
 
29 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
45 
 
77 
 
16 
 
25 
 
47 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
52 
 
78 
 
14 
 
19 
 
Sources: Australian Election Studies, 2001 (n=2010), 2004 (n=1769), 2007 (n=1873) 
and 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 3: Gender, age, region, religion and vote, 2010 (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labor 
 
Lib.-
Nat. 
 
 
Greens 
 
Other 
 
(N) 
  
 Gender 
Male  
Female 
 
 Age Group 
Under 25 
25 to 44 
45 to 64 
65 and over 
 
 Region 
Rural 
Urban 
 
 Religious Denomination 
Catholic 
Anglican 
Uniting 
Other 
No religion 
 
 Church Attendance 
At least once a month 
At least once a year 
Less than once a year 
Never 
 
 
 
36 
44 
 
 
37 
43 
43 
33 
 
 
35 
42 
 
 
41 
35 
38 
38 
45 
 
 
34 
41 
31 
45 
 
 
50 
41 
 
 
41 
39 
44 
61 
 
 
51 
44 
 
 
48 
56 
53 
47 
32 
 
 
54 
50 
51 
39 
 
 
  12 
  13 
 
 
19 
17 
11 
  4 
 
 
11 
13 
 
 
  9 
  8 
  6 
13 
21 
 
 
  8 
  8 
17 
15 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
3 
2 
2 
2 
 
 
3 
1 
 
 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
 
 
4 
1 
1 
2 
 
 
 
(976) 
(977) 
 
 
(189) 
(666) 
(707) 
(391) 
 
 
(434) 
(1502) 
 
 
(510) 
(385) 
(220) 
(297) 
(534) 
 
 
(300) 
(440) 
(313) 
(885) 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 4: Education, occupational indicators and vote, 2010 (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labor 
 
Lib.-
Nat. 
 
 
Greens 
 
Other 
 
(N) 
  
 Education 
No post-school qualifications 
Non-degree qualifications 
University degree 
 
 Occupation 
Manual 
Non-manual 
 
 Employment 
Self-employed 
Government employee 
 
 Trade Union Membership 
Union member 
Not a union member  
 
 
 
43 
39 
39 
 
 
46 
37 
 
 
27 
48 
 
 
53 
36 
 
 
46 
49 
39 
 
 
42 
47 
 
 
60 
36 
 
 
31 
50 
 
 
 
 
 10 
   9 
 20 
 
 
 10 
 14 
 
 
 12 
 14 
 
 
 14 
 13 
 
 
1 
2 
2 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
(594) 
(785) 
(541) 
 
 
(549) 
(1199) 
 
 
(292) 
(447) 
 
 
(426) 
(1412) 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 5: Ratings of leaders and parties, 2010 (means on 0-10 scale) 
 
 
 
Leader 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
Party 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Julia Gillard 
 
Tony Abbott 
 
Warren Truss 
 
Bob Brown 
 
Wayne Swan 
 
Kevin Rudd 
 
 
4.9 
 
4.3 
 
4.1 
 
4.1 
 
4.0 
 
5.0 
 
3.1 
 
3.1 
 
2.2 
 
2.9 
 
2.5 
 
3.1 
 
Labor 
 
Liberal 
 
National 
 
Greens 
 
 
 
5.1 
 
5.1 
 
4.3 
 
4.2 
 
3.0 
 
3.3 
 
2.7 
 
3.0 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 6: Ratings of party leaders by gender, 2010 (means on 0-10 scale) 
 
 
 
Leader 
 
Men 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
Std. Dev.
 
Julia Gillard 
 
Tony Abbott 
 
Warren Truss 
 
Bob Brown 
 
Wayne Swan 
 
Kevin Rudd 
 
 
4.5 
 
4.5 
 
4.0 
 
3.8 
 
3.9 
 
4.8 
 
3.1 
 
3.0 
 
2.1 
 
3.0 
 
2.6 
 
3.1 
 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
4.0 
 
4.2 
 
4.5 
 
4.1 
 
5.2 
 
3.0 
 
3.1 
 
1.9 
 
2.8 
 
2.4 
 
3.0 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 7: Leadership qualities ascribed to Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott, 2010 
(percentage saying quality describes leader extremely well or quite well) 
 
 
 
Quality 
 
Julia Gillard 
 
Tony Abbott 
 
 
Intelligent 
 
Compassionate 
 
Competent 
 
Sensible 
 
Provides strong leadership 
 
Honest 
 
Knowledgeable 
 
Inspiring 
 
Trustworthy 
 
 
87 
 
58 
 
70 
 
70 
 
58 
 
48 
 
78 
 
42 
 
40 
 
69 
 
44 
 
54 
 
48 
 
52 
 
43 
 
57 
 
28 
 
36 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 8: Importance of election issues (percentage describing issue as extremely 
important) and party differential (percentage saying Labor closer on 
issue minus percentage saying Liberal-National closer), 2010 
 
 
    
       Importance 
 
 
Issue 
 
 
All 
voters 
 
Labor 
voters 
 
Lib.-
Nat. 
voters 
 
Green 
voters 
 
Other 
voters 
 
Party 
differential 
 
Global warming 
 
Taxation 
 
Education 
 
Unemployment 
 
The environment 
 
Interest rates 
 
Industrial relations 
 
Health and Medicare 
 
Refugees and asylum seekers 
 
The resources tax 
 
Population policy 
 
Management of the economy 
 
 
30 
 
40 
 
61 
 
40 
 
41 
 
43 
 
28 
 
73 
 
37 
 
30 
 
32 
 
70 
 
 
40 
 
37 
 
67 
 
45 
 
48 
 
43 
 
35 
 
78 
 
32 
 
25 
 
30 
 
68 
 
 
16 
 
46 
 
55 
 
38 
 
28 
 
48 
 
22 
 
70 
 
42 
 
37 
 
36 
 
80 
 
 
55 
 
34 
 
67 
 
34 
 
72 
 
31 
 
29 
 
71 
 
37 
 
22 
 
26 
 
51 
 
 
33 
 
40 
 
63 
 
43 
 
43 
 
42 
 
31 
 
74 
 
46 
 
38 
 
37 
 
74 
 
 
+11 
 
-6 
 
+17 
 
+7 
 
+13 
 
-9 
 
+9 
 
+11 
 
-17 
 
-5 
 
-5 
 
-9 
 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
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Table 9: Multivariate analysis of significant influences on voting behaviour, 2010  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardised 
regression 
coefficient 
  
Standardised 
regression 
coefficient 
 
 
Gender (male) 
 
Education (university degree) 
 
Religious denomination 
(Catholic) 
 
Region (rural) 
 
Party identification 
 
Julia Gillard 
 
Tony Abbott 
 
Education 
 
Management of the economy 
 
R-squared 
 
 
  .03  
 
  .03 
 
  .04 
 
 
  .03 
 
  .55 
 
 -.24 
 
  .15 
 
  .08 
 
  .13 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.74 
 
  .03 
 
  .03 
 
  .04 
 
 
  .03 
  
  .52 
 
 -.16 
 
  .10 
 
  .06 
 
  .10 
 
 
 
Note: Entries in the table are statistically significant at p < .05 or better.  
Further methodological details can be found in the appendix. 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2010 (n=2061). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
